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Abstract   Generic advertising is used by fish producers to accelerate demand
growth or to alleviate temporary surpluses. Whether this cooperative promotional
venture is profitable depends on a number of factors including industry supply
response. A rent-dissipation model applied to the U.S. catfish industry suggests the
quasi-rents generated by increased advertising are more than sufficient to cover
incremental costs over any reasonable time horizon.
Key words   Aquaculture, collective action, generic advertising, rent dissipation.
Introduction
Despite growing interest in generic advertising among fish farmers and the seafood
industry (e.g., Kinnucan and Venkateswaran 1990; Bjorndahl, Salvanes, and
Andreassen 1992), important questions remain about the profitability of cooperative
advertising ventures. The essential problem, as elucidated by Clement (1963) over
30 years ago and more recently by Jensen et al. (1992) and Hayes and Jensen
(1993), is that when advertising increases demand, prices rise and producers in com-
petitive markets respond by expanding output. The increase in production depresses
price, which dissipates the quasi-rents generated by the original increase in advertis-
ing. One possible outcome is that producers may be no better off after the increase
in advertising than they were before the increase. The hypothesis that profits from
generic advertising may prove illusory in an industry without effective supply con-
trol is herewith called the “rent-dissipation hypothesis.”
A number of situations that lead to rent dissipation have been recognized in the
literature. Most of these involve rents in the context of imperfect competition (e.g.,
Fudenberg and Tirole 1987) or common property resources (e.g., Bell 1986; Dupont
1991). As an example of the latter, Bockstael, Strand, and Lipton (1992) constructed
an optimal control model of the Maryland oyster industry to examine the tradeoffs
between capital formation (in response to generic advertising) and subsequent re-
ductions in shellfish stocks. The dynamic nature of increased effort followed by re-
source depletion suggested an optimal strategy of pulsed generic advertising, al-
though the authors emphasized that profits were likely to be short-lived, with the
system tending toward a steady-state equilibrium of zero profits.
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The catfish industry is considered to be relatively competitive and thus not a
candidate for wasteful “rent-seeking” activities characteristic of monopoly rent dis-
sipation. Neither are catfish stocks representative of a common property resource.
Although the catfish industry has elements of an open access resource in the sense
that entry is not restricted, capacity expansion does not lead to depletion of the re-
source base (fish stocks). In a situation where bioeconomic modeling of stock deple-
tion is not a consideration, dissipation of rents from cooperative advertising may be
better modeled in a comparative statics framework. Incorporating key parameters
such as demand, supply, and advertising elasticities, as well as the distribution of the
advertising “tax” burden along the marketing channel, is more tractable in a static
equilibrium model. A comparative static model permits examining the interplay be-
tween supply elasticity and quasi-rents generated from increased advertising, hold-
ing constant other factors that affect advertising effectiveness, such as processing
technology.
To test the rent-dissipation hypothesis, we develop a model of rent dissipation
and apply it to the U.S. catfish industry. Catfish producers invest more in coopera-
tive advertising than any other group in the seafood sector, an estimated $2.2 million
in 1995 (The Catfish Journal, March 1995). Furthermore, catfish producers operate
in an industry that has structural features that are similar to other seafood producers,
such as unrestricted entry and a concentrated processing sector, so the modeling pro-
cedure should be of interest to those interested in cooperative advertising of other
seafood commodities.
Promotion of catfish began in earnest in 1987 when feed mills in Mississippi
agreed to finance the program with a voluntary levy of $6 on each ton of feed sold.
Funds for the national campaign are administered by The Catfish Institute, an indus-
try marketing organization. Some producers and industry observers have argued that
such expenditures are excessive considering the lack of supply controls and the ca-
pacity for vigorous expansion in response to higher output prices. Others argue that
not enough funds are being invested. The model described below attempts to resolve
this controversy.
The Model
The model is a partial-equilibrium model that assumes competitive market clearing
at all market levels (farm, wholesale, retail). Demand is assumed to be a decreasing
function of price and an increasing function of advertising. Supply is assumed to be
a non-decreasing function of price. Following Nerlove and Waugh (1961), advertis-
ing is treated as an exogenous lump-sum expenditure. For simplicity we assume two
market levels: wholesale and farm.
The structural equations defining initial equilibrium are:
Qd = D(Pw, A) (wholesale demand) (1)
Xs = S(Pf, Z) (farm supply) (2)
Pw = M(Pf, C) (farm-wholesale price linkage) (3)
Qd = kXs (market clearing) (4)
R = Pf Xs –  S t dt A
X
– () – 1
0 ∫ φ (farm-level rent) (5)Advertising Rent Dissipation 375
where Qd is the quantity demanded at wholesale; Xs is the quantity supplied at the
farm level; Pw is wholesale price; Pf is farm price; A is advertising expenditures; Z is
a “supply shifter” (e.g., technology) that lowers the cost of producing the farm-
based input; C is a marketing cost variable (e.g., wage rates in processing plants); R
is producer surplus (quasi-rent) at the farm level; S–1 is the farm-level supply sched-
ule written in inverse form, i.e., price as a function of quantity in equation (2); and k
is the number of units of wholesale product per unit of the farm product, i.e., k =
Qs /Xd, where Qs is the quantity supplied at wholesale, and Xd is the quantity de-
manded at farm. Quantity k is hereafter referred to as the “dressing percentage.”
The price-linkage equation (equation [3]) is a quasi-reduced form that reflects
the behavior of processors (Hildreth and Jarrett 1955). That the equation depicts ac-
curately the relationship between the wholesale price and the farm price rests on the
assumption that forces that cause the two prices to change (e.g., shifts in wholesale
demand or farm supply) exert their influences separately rather than in combination
(Gardner, p. 404). If this is not the case, a more complicated form of the price-trans-
mission equation may need to be specified (Wohlgenant and Mullen).1
The competitive marketing-clearing condition (equation [4]) may be questioned
given the high degree of industry concentration at the processor level and collective
price bargaining at the farm level (Kinnucan and Sullivan 1986; Kinnucan 1995).
Testing for non-competitive pricing, Kouka (1995) found some evidence of oli-
gopoly power at the wholesale level, but cautions “...it is still necessary to prove
whether or not conjectural elasticities ... constitute a definitive proof of a departure
from perfect competition” (p. 13). Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch’s (1992) analysis
indicated that despite industry concentration at the processor level, benefits from in-
creased consumer advertising were passed back to the farm level. Rapid growth and
decline in the processing sector (from 14 plants in 1986 to 37 in 1990 to 25 in 1994,
Moore 1994) suggest low entry/exit barriers, a condition consistent with a contest-
able market (Baumol, Panzer, and Willig 1982). These facts suggest that despite mo-
nopoly elements in the catfish marketing channel, competitive market clearing is
valid, at least for the purposes of this analysis.
The catfish advertising program is funded through a voluntary levy on catfish
feed. However, because of tax shifting (Chang and Kinnucan 1991), feed mills pass
a portion of the levy on to farmers in the form of higher feed prices. Owing to the
lump-sum treatment of advertising expenditures, the farmers’ share of the tax levy is
represented by the φ  parameter in the rent equation. The “incidence” parameter φ
can assume any value between zero and one depending on the degree to which feed
mills shift the levy to farmers.
To discover how rents dissipate following an increase in advertising, we solved
the model for two reduced forms. One reduced form assumes that catfish processing
technology is Leontief, i.e., live catfish and processing inputs are combined in fixed
proportions to produce the retail product. This assumption implies that the dressing
percentage k in equation (4) is a constant.
The second reduced form assumes that processing technology exhibits constant
returns to scale (CRTS). That is, the processing sector’s production function is as-
sumed to be linearly homogeneous. Although economic-engineering studies suggest
1 Equation (3) is consistent with Heien’s (1980) markup pricing hypothesis that reflects dynamic inven-
tory adjustment in a marketing industry characterized by constant returns to scale and Leontief produc-
tion technology at the retail level. Wohlgenant and Mullen’s (1987) specifications imply that quantity is
a relevant variable in the price-linkage equation, an implication that is inconsistent with previous re-
search (e.g., Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch 1992) and our own attempts to model price-transmission in
the catfish sector. Lyon and Thompson’s (1993) work suggests that the markup model performs at least
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individual firms in the catfish processing sector display increasing returns (Fuller
and Dillard 1984), industry technology is likely to exhibit constant returns
(Diewert). Under CRTS, the k term in equation (4) is permitted to vary with changes
in industry output. The two reduced forms permit an analysis of the effect of pro-
cessing technology on rent dissipation.
To derive the reduced forms, we first expressed equations (1) – (5) in log-differ-
ential form:
dlnQd = – N dlnPw + B dlnA (6)
dlnXs = E dlnPf + L dlnZ (7)
dlnPw = T dlnPf + W dlnC (8)
dlnQd = dlnXs + dlnk (9)
dR = Pf Xs dlnPf  – φ A dlnA (10)
where dlnY * 100 is interpreted as the percent change in Y; N is the absolute value of
the wholesale-level demand elasticity; B is the advertising elasticity; E is the farm-
level supply elasticity; T is the farm-wholesale price-transmission elasticity; L is an
elasticity that indicates the effect on farm supply of an increase in Z; and W is an
elasticity that indicates the effect on wholesale price of an increase in marketing
costs.2 Given the negative sign in equation (1), N, E, W, L, and B are assumed to be
positive. The price-transmission elasticity T in general is expected to be positive and
will be less than one if observed price changes are due to retail demand shifts and
farm supply is less elastic than the supply of marketing inputs (Kinnucan and Forker
1987, p. 289, fn. 4, and table 4).
In the above system, all endogenous variables except rent (R) are expressed in
relative rather than absolute changes. Bearing in mind that in competitive equilib-
rium Qd = Qs = Q and Xs = Xd = X, the dressing percentage is k = Q/X. Thus, the
equilibrium condition (equation [9]) can be rewritten as
dlnQ = dlnX + dln (Q/X)( 9 ′ )
Equation (9′ ) indicates that the relationship between equilibrium quantities at the
two market levels depends on the behavior of the dressing percentage, i.e., dln
(Q/X). One possibility is that the dressing percentage (average product) is constant.
This is consistent with a Leontief processing technology, which implies that dln
(Q/X) = 0 (Chambers 1988, p. 16). An alternative and less restrictive assumption is
that the dressing percentage varies, but in a manner that is consistent with a CRTS
processing technology. Under CRTS, and assuming that processing inputs are paid
their marginal products, dln (Q/X) = dln (Pf /Pw).3
The foregoing assumptions are incorporated into the model by replacing the
2 As pointed out by a reviewer, the price-transmission elasticity in general is not a fixed constant but
varies with the quantity of product processed and marketed (Wohlgenant and Haidacher, pp. 5–6). How-
ever, given the modest increases in quantity induced by advertising (less than 2% for catfish according
to Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch 1992), the assumption that the transmission elasticity is constant is in-
nocuous for the purposes of this paper.
3 To see this, let Q = h(X) represent the processing plants’ aggregate production function. By Euler’s theorem
(Chiang 1984, pp. 413–14) if Q = h(X) is linearly homogenous (CRTS), then Q = (∂ Q/∂ X)X. Setting ∂ Q/∂ X =
Pf /Pw (live catfish is paid the value of its marginal product), CRTS implies that Q/X = Pf /Pw.Advertising Rent Dissipation 377
equilibrium condition (9′ ) with the following alternative expressions
dlnQ = dlnX (fixed-proportions market clearing) (11a)
dlnQ = dlnX + dlnPf – dlnPw (variable-proportions market clearing) (11b)
Equations (11a) and (11b) form the basis for obtaining reduced-form expressions for
dR under fixed and variable proportions. In so doing, because our chief interest fo-
cuses on advertising effects, we set dlnC = dlnZ = 0.
For fixed-proportions, equations (6), (7), (8), and (11a) are solved simulta-
neously for dlnPf, which yields:
dlnPf = [B/(E + NT)] dlnA (12a)
Equation (12a) indicates the effect of an increase in advertising on farm price. Be-
cause N is defined to be positive and T > 0 by assumption, equation (12a) yields the
hypothesis that an increase in advertising always increases farm price, so long as ad-
vertising is effective, i.e., B > 0. However, advertising’s price enhancement ability
depends critically on the elasticity of supply. In particular, price enhancement
decreases as supply becomes more elastic, and will be zero if supply is horizon-
tal (E →  ∞ ). That advertising effectiveness increases as the demand elasticity in
equation (12a) gets smaller is consistent with the Dorfman-Steiner (1954) theorem
and the Nerlove-Waugh (1961) model.
We next solve for the reduced-form equation for farm price under variable pro-
portions. This entails solving equations (6) – (8) and (11b) simultaneously for dlnPf :
dlnPf = {B/[E + NT + (1 – T)]} dlnA (12b)
Comparing equations (12a) and (12b), it can be seen that variable proportions, in
general, soften the effect of advertising on farm price. That is, so long as 0 < T < 1,
the reduced-form coefficient in (12b) is less than the reduced-form coefficient in
(12a), meaning that increases in advertising have a smaller effect on farm price un-
der variable proportions than under fixed proportions. This result is consistent with
the fact that under variable proportions the firm is permitted to substitute marketing
inputs for the farm-based input as the price of the farm-based input rises due to ad-
vertising. This substitution possibility in essence weakens the demand for the farm-
based input, which lessens advertising’s price effect.4
Rent-dissipation equations under fixed and variable proportions are obtained by
substituting (12a) and (12b), respectively, into (10), which yields:
dRF = {[Pf XB – φ A(E + NT)]/(E + NT)} dlnA (13a)
dRV = {[Pf XB – φ A(E + NT + (1 – T))]/(E + NT + (1 – T))} dlnA (13b)
Equations (13a) and (13b) represent the effect of an increase in advertising on pro-
ducer surplus (quasi-rent) under fixed and variable proportions, respectively. The ef-
fect in either case can be positive, zero, or negative depending on the relative mag-
nitudes of the two terms on either side of the negative sign in equation (13)’s nu-
4 Although T theoretically can be negative (see Gardner 1975, p. 404, fn. 10), this is unusual and would
imply a negative relationship between increases in advertising and rent if supply is fixed (see equation
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merators. In general, the larger the commodity’s value or advertising elasticity and
the smaller the producer incidence of the advertising levy, ceteris paribus, the more
likely that an increase in advertising will generate positive producer rents.
Rent Dissipation
That rents dissipate in response to advertising-induced increases in output is seen by
examining the relationship between dR and E in equations (13a) and (13b). For ex-
ample, consider the reduced-form coefficient for rent under fixed proportions, i.e.,
ζ  = {[Pf XB – φ  A(E + NT)]/(E + NT)} in equation (13a). The derivative of this coef-
ficient with respect to E is:
∂ζ /∂ E = –Pf XB/(E + NT)2 (14)
Equation (14) indicates the effect of an increase in the supply elasticity on
advertising’s rent-enhancement ability under fixed proportions. So long as advertis-
ing is effective, i.e., B > 0, equation (14) is always negative. Thus, for example, as
the farm supply schedule rotates from the vertical to the horizontal, i.e., E increases,
the incremental effect of an increase in advertising on producer surplus diminishes
and in the limit becomes negative.5 A similar conclusion obtains under variable pro-
portions.
Because supply becomes more elastic as more time is permitted for producers to
adjust inputs in response to changes in price, equations (13a) and (13b) provide a
framework for measuring the returns to promotion under differing lengths of run. In
particular, consider a situation in which advertising is increased and maintained at
the higher level for a period of three years. Assume that advertising carryover is
such that the market demand schedule shifts up by its full amount within one year
following the advertising increase, i.e., from D to D1 in figure 1. Assume further that
S1, S2, and S3 represent supply schedules pertaining to lengths-of-run, respectively,
of one year, two years, and three years. The one-year supply schedule S1 is vertical,
which means that the increase in rent (exclusive of the extra advertising costs) asso-
ciated with the demand shift is simply the increase in industry revenue, area P0abP1
in figure 1. This area (after subtracting incremental advertising costs) is measured
by equations (13a) and (13b) by setting E = 0. This represents the net producer re-
turns in the first year following the increase in advertising.
The increase in gross producer returns in the second year is indicated by the
area P0acP2. The second-year returns, owing to the supply response, are smaller than
the first-year returns. Suppose the supply elasticity pertaining to S2 (evaluated at
point a) is E = 0.5. Setting E = 0.5 in equations (13a) and (13b) (and maintaining the
other parameters at their original values) provides a measure of second-year net re-
turns. These returns reflect the cost of producing the extra output induced by the in-
creased advertising (Q2 – Q1) as well as the incremental advertising cost of main-
taining demand at D1 in the second year.
The third-year returns, which are indicated by the area P0adP3, are obtained by
setting E in equations (13a) and (13b) equal to the supply elasticity that represents
5 That an increase in advertising causes a reduction in producer surplus when supply is horizontal is
found by taking the limit of equation (13a) or (13b) as E approaches infinity, which yields dR = –Aφ
dlnA < 0. This result follows from the fact that when supply is perfectly elastic, quasi-rents are zero, so
increases in advertising cause dollar-for-dollar increases in industry (incidence-adjusted) costs. In other
words, with horizontal supply, benefits from advertising, if any, accrue strictly to consumers (e.g., see
Alston, Carman, and Chalfant 1994, pp. 149–51).Advertising Rent Dissipation 379
producer response over a three-year time horizon. The price-depressing effects of
supply response are greatest in the third year, so the net returns are the smallest and
may be negative if the increase in producer surplus is not sufficient to cover third-
year incremental advertising costs. Total (undiscounted) returns for the three-year
period are obtained by adding the returns from each of the three years. In this static




To determine the extent of rent dissipation in the catfish industry, equations (13a)
and (13b) were parameterized using previously estimated values for the relevant
elasticities and baseline values for price, quantity, and advertising as indicated in
table 1. The parameters were taken from Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch’s (1992)
study of catfish advertising in which monthly data for the period 1980–89 were used
to estimate supply, demand, and price-transmission equations for the wholesale- and
Figure 1.  Effect of Supply Response on Generic Advertising Rent DissipationKinnucan, Nelson, and Xiao 380
Table 1
Baseline (1994) Values and Model Parameters, U.S. Catfish Industry
Item Definition Value
Baseline values:
Pf Initial farm price ($/lb.) 0.78
X Initial production (million lbs. live weight) 439
A Initial advertising level (million $) 1.625
Parameters:
B Advertising elasticity 0.0075
N Wholesale-level demand elasticity 1.01
T Farm-wholesale price transmission elasticity 0.68
φ Advertising tax-shifting parameter 0.50, 1.00
dlnA Percent change in advertising/100 0.10
E Supply elasticity 0.00, 0.540, 0.730
farm-levels of the market. That study estimated a wholesale-level demand elasticity
of –1.01, a price-transmission elasticity of 0.68, and an advertising elasticity of
0.0075.
The foregoing elasticities are largely consistent with estimates based on more
recent data. For example, using monthly data for 1986–93, Kinnucan (1995) esti-
mates a wholesale-farm (not farm-wholesale) transmission elasticity of 0.41 and an
advertising elasticity of 0.0066. Using annual data for 1977–93, Kouka (1995, p. 11)
estimates a demand elasticity of –1.17. It should be pointed out, however, that
Kinnucan (1995) estimated a demand elasticity of –0.32, which suggests that catfish
demand is becoming less elastic over time. To the extent that this is the case,
Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch’s (1992) estimate of N = 1.01 will produce an overly
conservative estimate of producer returns to increased advertising.6
The degree to which the advertising tax is shifted from feed mills to catfish
farmers depends on the relative slopes of the supply and demand curves at each mar-
ket level and the nature of the marketing margin (Chang and Kinnucan 1991). For
the purposes of this study, we consider two alternative scenarios: catfish producers
pay all of the tax (φ  = 1.00) and the tax is shared equally between producers and
mills (φ  = 0.50). The value of φ  is unlikely to be less than 0.50 because the demand
for catfish feed is expected to be less elastic than the supply of catfish feed.
The baseline (initial equilibrium) values for farm price and quantity were ob-
tained from the USDA’s Aquaculture Outlook (1995) and refer to average industry
values for 1994. The baseline value for advertising was set at $1.625 million, the ac-
tual level of industry advertising in 1994 (Allen 1994).
The supply elasticity, the key parameter from the standpoint of testing the rent-
dissipation hypothesis, is set at zero for the one-year time horizon, 0.540 for two
years, and 0.730 for three years. These elasticity estimates were computed from
Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch’s (1992) table 2, which reports distributed lag esti-
mates of supply response for a 32-month time horizon. In computing these elastici-
6 To see this, let ζ  = {[Pf XB – φ A(E + NT)]/(E + NT)} in equation (13a). The derivative of this coeffi-
cient with respect to N is ∂ζ /∂ N = –Pf XBT/(E + NT)2, which is always negative for positive B and T.
That is, under fixed proportions, advertising-induced increases in rent diminish as demand becomes
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ties, we set non-significant coefficients in the distributed lag to zero.7 The two-year
supply elasticity of 0.540 is consistent with Branch and Tilley’s (1991) estimated
“harvest-response” elasticity of 0.578. For the simulation exercise, all parameters
except the supply elasticity and the tax-incidence parameter are held constant at
their baseline values. The simulations, based on an assumed 10% sustained increase
in advertising, are presented in table 2.
Results
Results confirm the tendency of generic advertising rents to dissipate over time as
supply responds to price, but producer returns are sensitive to processing technology
and tax incidence. If producers and feed mills share the levy equally, advertising is
always profitable for producers, i.e., incremental benefits (quasi-rents) exceed incre-
mental costs throughout the three-year horizon. If, however, producers bear the full
incidence and processing technology is characterized by variable proportions, an in-
crease in advertising is profitable only in the first two years. In the third year, adver-
tising rents are insufficient to cover the incremental advertising cost. The third-year
loss, however, is modest ($15,000) and is more than offset by gains in the first two
years. Overall, therefore, it appears that supply is sufficiently price inelastic—in the
“long run,” as well as the short run—to render cooperative advertising a profitable
venture for the catfish industry, at least for the parameter values reported in table 1.
It is common in the generic advertising literature to report benefit-cost ratios
(e.g., Ward and Lambert 1993; Liu, et al. 1990; Wohlgenant and Clary 1993). Ben-
efit-cost ratios must be interpreted with caution in that some researchers use average
rather than marginal ratios, or indicate gross returns rather than net returns. An addi-
tional problem is that some reported benefit-cost ratios assume that supply is fixed
7 When non-significant lagged coefficients are included in the computations, the two-year and three-year
supply elasticities are smaller, namely 0.285, and 0.363. We chose to use the larger elasticities because
rents are smaller, providing a more conservative test of rent dissipation. The formula used to calculate
the elasticities is E = δ 1 µ i i
n ∑  where n is the desired time horizon (e.g., n = 12 for 12 months) and δ 1 and
µ i are parameter values listed in table 2 of Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch (1992).
Table 2
Time Stream of Producer Surplus from a Sustained 10% Increase in Generic
Advertising Under Fixed and Variable Proportions for Alternative Values
of the Tax Shifting Parameter (φ ), U.S. Catfish Industry, 1994
Fixed Proportions Variable Proportions
Time Period φ  = 0.50 φ  = 1.00 φ  = 0.50 φ  = 1.00
Thousand Dollars
Year 1 293 211 174  93
Year 2 128 47 85 4
Year 3 100 19 67 –15
Years 1–3 521 277 326 82
Marginal B/C ratio
First year 1.80 1.30 1.07 0.57
Years 1–3 1.07 0.57 0.67 0.17Kinnucan, Nelson, and Xiao 382
(e.g., Ward and Lambert 1993; Wohlgenant and Clary 1993) while other ratios take
into account supply response (e.g., Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch 1992). Most re-
ported ratios assume that the farmer bears the full cost of the advertising, i.e., tax-
shifting is ignored.
Bearing in mind these caveats, marginal benefit-cost ratios are reported in table 2.
These ratios measure the net marginal return to increased advertising, i.e., the incremen-
tal return after all economic costs have been subtracted, including the cost of the addi-
tional advertising. The first-year ratios measure “short-run” returns, i.e., returns when
supply is fixed. The 1–3 year ratios measure the “long-run” returns, i.e., returns after
sufficient time has elapsed for quantity to adjust to the higher price induced by increased
advertising. The long-run ratios are calculated by dividing the cumulative net rents indi-
cated in table 2 by the cumulative incremental cost of maintaining the demand schedule
at D1 in figure 1 over the three-year horizon, i.e., $487,500 (= 3 ×  $162,500).
According to these ratios, depending on tax incidence and processing technol-
ogy, catfish producers realize short-run marginal rates of return of between 57% and
180%. In the long-run, marginal rates of return are smaller, 17%–109%, but still suf-
ficiently large to suggest that the industry is underinvesting in the cooperative ad-
vertising program. (In our model, advertising rents are maximized when the mar-
ginal B-C ratio is zero.)
That advertising levels appear to be sub-optimal is not surprising given volun-
tary funding and the related problem of free-riding. With voluntary funding non-par-
ticipating feed mills (and their farmer-customers) escape the costs, but enjoy the
benefits from advertising-induced increases in market price. The de facto inability to
exclude price-based benefits from free riders means that an incentive exists not to
participate in the program. Thus, collective goods such as cooperative advertising
tend to be underfunded (Hardin 1982). Still, based on the increased spending
planned for 1995 (to $2.2 million), it would appear that catfish producers are begin-
ning to appreciate the benefits of cooperative advertising enough to fund the pro-
gram at progressively higher levels.
Conclusions
The major theme of this study is that supply response attenuates the returns that fish
producers can expect from cooperative advertising ventures. However, whether the
increased output elicited by a successful advertising campaign is sufficient to render
cooperative advertising unprofitable is an empirical question that hinges in part on
advertising, demand, and supply elasticities and tax shifting. In our model, the prof-
itability of advertising is directly related to the advertising elasticity and inversely
related to the supply elasticity, the absolute value of the demand elasticity, and tax
incidence, i.e., the extent to which producers bear the burden of the advertising levy.
Because few production alternatives exist for catfish ponds and equipment, as-
set fixity operates as a natural deterrent to entry or expansion, causing supply re-
sponse in the catfish industry to be relatively inelastic at the farm level. Further-
more, demand for catfish at the wholesale level is at most unitary elastic and is
probably becoming less elastic over time (Kinnucan 1995, p. 124). This combination
of elasticities results in sufficient rents from increased advertising to more than off-
set incremental costs over any reasonable time horizon, at least according to our
model simulations. Thus, the rent-dissipation hypothesis as articulated earlier re-
ceives no support from the analysis presented here.
Processing technology proved to be an important factor governing producer
rents from increased advertising. In particular, Leontief technology produced simu-
lated “long-run” returns that were 75%–230% higher than CRTS technology. ThisAdvertising Rent Dissipation 383
suggests that producers have a stake in the type of technology adopted by processing
plants, at least from the standpoint of maximizing benefits from cooperative marketing
programs. It also suggests that marketing industry technology has an important bearing
on cooperative advertising benefit-cost analysis, an issue worthy of further research.
Despite rejection of the rent-dissipation hypothesis in this study, caution must
be exercised in generalizing the findings to other commodities or, indeed, to the cat-
fish industry in the future. For example, potential changes in advertising elasticities
over time render such generalizations unreliable.8 In addition, the catfish industry is
distinctive in that a strong growth trend overlays, and perhaps augments, the generic
advertising effort. Still, this study suggests cooperative advertising can enhance
farm income, provided that supply response is sufficiently muted to limit the in-
creases in output that inevitably flow from price-enhancement endeavors in a com-
petitive industry.
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